


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Abraham J. Karp
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THREESCORE AND TEN

Essays in Honor of
Rabbi Seymour J. Cohen
on the Occasion of His
Seventieth Birthday

Edited by

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PERSONALITY AND COVENANT RELATIONSHIP

HAROLD M. SCHULWEIS

What presuppositions lie behind addressing God as a Thou? Henry Aiken contends that to speak of deity as personality means that "we automatically treat it as an agent to whom certain obligations are due and from which the fulfillment of corresponding obligations may be expected."¹ To know that we deal with a personality means that He will not act capriciously. Reasonable expectations relative to His behavior seem to follow from the ascription of personality to the Supreme Being. We are not as convinced as Aiken that personality always entails the obligatory relationships which he suggests. It may be argued that personality endows the agent with cognitive, conative, and volitional powers without making any claims as to its moral character. But if we derive the meaning of addressing God as person from the bulk of Judaically-interpreted liturgical and scriptural literature, a stronger case in favor of Aiken's position may be made. In one such major reading of testament and liturgy, the Thou addressed is understood to be a morally responsible personality, eminently trustworthy. The covenant relationship into which He enters with man is morally intelligible, its conditions binding upon divine and human personalities. In the context of the covenant, the essential predicate of His personality is morality, not omnipotence of will. The greatness of God's personality is revealed in the self-limitation of His absolute power so that He may enter into a proper moral relationship with man. The personal God of the Bible is bound neither to *moira* nor to *ananke*. He voluntarily submits Himself to the ethics of righteousness. The original meaning of *brith*, or

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"covenant," T. Begrich explains, refers to an arrangement of partners unequal in status but one in which the more powerful "binds himself to a certain attitude towards the less powerful on condition that the less powerful fulfills his part of the agreement."²

God's personality is not used to derogate man's moral sense or to demonstrate His own amoral freedom. God wishes man to understand Him morally so that he can emulate Him morally. God informs Abraham of His plans for Sodom and Gomorrah, "for I have known him to the end that he may command his children and his household after him, and they may keep the way of the Lord, to do righteousness and justice."³ Nothing vitiates the moral purpose of the covenant as much as the envelopment of God in a mist of supramoral inscrutability. It is the measure of the greatness of His personality that He is morally intelligible. "For the Lord will do nothing, but He revealeth His counsel unto His servants the prophets."⁴ For Jeremiah, God wishes to be known. To know God is no metaphysical exercise. It means to imitate God's moral concern for the weaker vessels of society. "Did not thy father eat and drink, and do justice and righteousness? Then it was well with him. He judged the cause of the poor and needy; then it was well. *Is not this to know Me? saith the Lord.*"⁵

The lingua franca between the two personalities of the covenant, God and man, is morality. Man understands and shares a common vocabulary with God. The universe of discourse is not metaphysics but morality. Metaphysically God may remain a mystery; morally no such epistemic distance is allowed. God's punishment of Sodom and Gomorrah must make moral sense. Equally moral is Abraham's contention: "That be far from Thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked, so that the righteous fare as the wicked. Far be that from Thee. Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?"⁶ The biblical presuppositions which legitimate this human-divine encounter include:

- a. The moral nature of the divine personality
- b. The moral competence of man
- c. The moral comprehensibility of the covenant

These presuppositions authenticate the confrontation, which would otherwise be dismissed as an act of insolence. Where the divine personality is taken to embrace a moral meaning, the dissent

is justified by God's recognition of man's moral capacity to know right from wrong. The covenant then is dependent upon the juridic principle of "free negotiation, mutual assumption of duties and full recognition of the equal right of both parties concerned with the covenant."⁷ The moral personality of God confers dignity upon man and assures the inalienable rights of the covenant's cosignatories. The patriarch's critique, far from being an act of insubordination, is rooted in his commitment to God as the exemplary moral personality. He judges God by God. So the psalmist will admit to no guilt on the part of the people slaughtered as sheep in confronting God.

We have not forgotten Thee, or been false to Thy covenant. Our heart has not turned back, nor have our steps departed from Thy way that Thou shouldst have broken us in the place of jackals and covered us with deep darkness. If we have forgotten the name of our God, or spread our hands to a strange God, would not God discover this? For He knows the secrets of the heart. Nay, for Thy sake we are slain all the day long and are accounted as sheep for the slaughter. Rouse Thyself! Why sleepest Thou, O Lord?⁸

A talmudic discussion (*Sotah* 48) reports that the Levites of the First Temple recited this very psalm to awaken the slumbering God.

The Bible and the rabbinic tradition do not dismiss such bold positions as acts of hubris or *lese majeste*. If Job is resolved not to falsify his moral claims of innocence so as to justify God, if he continues to declare, "I hold my righteousness and will not let go," if God repudiates his friends, it is on the grounds of the moral covenant of reciprocity which informs their relationship. The bilateral covenant signifies that there is no double standard, one for God and one for man. As far as moral behavior is concerned, it means that one standard of righteousness extends vertically between man and God as it does horizontally between man and man. The covenant is one in heaven as it is on earth. Consequently, in the Bible, the moral predicates ascribed to God's personality do not appear to be qualitatively different from those assigned to man's. Goodness is univocally applied. Certainly God's goodness is not man's in a quantitative sense. Divine justice is more reliable, more trustworthy, more efficacious than man's. But the difference

appears as a matter of degree, not of kind. Indeed, the qualitative sameness of the moral attributes enables man's moral *imitatio dei*.

The dialogue which issues out of the covenant relationship is intensely personal. Questions of blame and responsibility for evil abound under the conditions of such interpersonal intimacy. Anthropomorphisms, some biblical theologians contend, are more precise than analytic theologic categories because the God of Scriptures cares about man. The purpose of anthropomorphism, Ludwig Kohler informs us, is

to make God accessible to man. It holds open the door for encounter and controversy between God's will and man's will. It represents God as person. It avoids the error of presenting God as a careless and soulless abstract idea or a fixed principle standing over against man like a strong silent battlement. God is personal. He has a will. He exists in controversy ready to communicate Himself.⁹

The believer in such a personal God knows that even in the midst of his suffering he has to do with no general principle, but with the personal word of God. He has to do with no academic conception of a being fettered by logical principles or constrained by fate. His God not only knows but cares; not only appreciates but acts.

The thunder and lightning of the Holocaust have revealed the disfigurements of that living relationship. How is the I-Thou relationship to be sustained after the onslaught of evil and the silence of God? What may be said of the living God so as to defend His constancy, His keeping the word of His covenant? What interpretations will the biblically grounded theodicies offer the moral predicates of the perfect personality?

MARTIN BUBER: EVIL AND THE DIALOGIC PRINCIPLE

Martin Buber's celebrated characterization of man's two primary attitudes and relations, I-Thou and I-It, is essential to an appreciation of his view of evil. Through his perception of this *Urzweiheit*, Buber comes to his understanding of the duality of good and evil.

Through the I-It mode of being, man orients himself to the world and to himself as object. The "other" is seen either objectively or subjectively; analyzed as a categorizable entity or experi-

enced in terms of personal "feelings." In either case, existence is dichotomized into subject and object. The "other" may be a tree or a horse, man or God. The I-It relation reduces the "other" to an observable, manipulable, predictable thing which is experienced and used. Love turns to possession, faith to security. No mutuality, no surprise is allowed to enter the mediated relationship. One cannot do without such relationships in the world. There are pragmatic needs and scientific goals which require order, precision, confirmability. But to live with such a mode of being alone is to deny oneself real living in meeting.

There is a relationship which man enters into with his whole being. The I-It relationship can never be entered into with one's undivided soul. It is the essential character of wholeness more than any other which distinguishes the I-Thou relationship from that of the I-It. Wholeness means that the other is approached without reservation, without holding back anything of one's entire being. It means that the other is accepted fully for what he is without any intention to use or transform him. The other is wholly free, wholly its own. The "I" is open to the uniqueness of the other and cannot anticipate what may emerge out of the direct meeting. What happens in such encounters is not reducible to the feelings of either "subject," nor is it reducible to the elements of either "object." The feelings or facts of an I-Thou relationship do not lend themselves to the familiar bifurcations of "inner" and "outer," subject and object, feelings and reason. They point to the hyphen of *das Zwischenmenschliche*, to the sphere of "betweenness" which bridges the separation of I and Thou. The unrehearsed meeting transforms one's life. What emerges from such a dialogue cannot be planned or reduced to a formula without turning it into a monologue.

Buber's dialogic principle is ontological in that it deals with man's relationship with being; and existential insofar as the principle is realized in the sphere of the existence of the person. Above all, the dialogical principle challenges any self-sufficient explanation which excludes the essential presence of the other. The genuine relationship Buber describes is "exclusive" in the sense that it fills our lives so that "all else lives in its light."¹⁰ The other, met with wholeness, may reside in the sphere of nature, in the life with man, or with "spiritual beings."¹¹

Only with the Eternal Thou is the relationship described as

being both unconditionally exclusive and unconditionally inclusive.¹² Through this absolute relation with God nothing remains isolated, unrelated. But even at the height of relational intensity with the Eternal Thou, Buber is adamant in preserving the inviolable individuality of both bearers of the relation. Where the "I" in ecstasy is melted into the "Thou," there the dialogue disintegrates. Where the "Thou" is identified with the "I," there monologue reigns beneath the dialogic mask. Absorption or identification destroys the mutuality of genuine dialogue. For there to be nearness between man and the other, there must be distance. As one of the Hasidic masters whom Buber cites explains to his disciples: "If I am I because I am I, and you are you because you are you, then I am I and you are you. But if I am I because you are you, and you are you because I am I, then I am not I and you are not you."¹³

Buber's philosophic orientation is particularly sensitive to the polarities of human existence and manifest in the twofold attitude of man. His description of the human-divine relationships partakes of that pervasive sense of duality in unity which permeates his writings. God is the "wholly other" and yet just as much the "wholly same." "Of course, He is the *Mysterium Tremendum* that appears and overthrows; but He is also the mystery of the self-evident, nearer to me than my I."¹⁴ God thus responds to man's dealings with the beings and things of the universe by pouring His divinity into all of nature. In this sense, it is man who "turns the world into a sacrament."¹⁵

What is required of man is his responsiveness to the call of the other. To be fully human man must make decisions. Authentic relationships demand decisions which are made with "all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy might." Good is defined by Buber in terms of decision and direction. Evil is equated with the decisionless, with the "aimless whirl of human potentialities."¹⁶ Buber's definition of evil makes it privative. It refers to the lack of direction, the absence of personal wholeness, the failure to make a decision. Evil breeds on half-heartedness. It is manifest in one's halfway existence. Unwhole we are inclined to the unholy.

Buber's ideal of wholeness commits him to the extravagant claim that evil cannot be done with one's whole being.¹⁷ When we hate, it is only with a part of us; and what we hate is only a part of the other. Through wholeness, evil can be turned to the service of

God. With wholeness, we can learn to unite the parts and learn how to forgive the other.

There is risk in entering a dialogic relationship and risk in making decisions. One does not know beforehand what will happen in the encounter, and engaging the other with one's whole being renders one vulnerable to the other. There is no ethical system at hand to make one's decision safe and secure. It is once more to wholeness that Buber appeals as the "inward source" which may authenticate our decision. We may find confidence in "that we speak the true Thou only with the whole soul, where the stubborn contradiction no longer lurks in the corners."¹⁸

All the diverse decisions we are called upon to make are united by one direction taken by the unified soul. That direction may be apprehended as the movement toward becoming what we are uniquely intended to become.¹⁹ Properly understood, the direction of I-Thou self-fulfillment expresses the direction toward God.

Buber has described his philosophic standpoint as "the narrow ridge." In his treatment of evil and his justifications of God's role in history, the precariousness of his stance becomes ever more apparent. His image of wholeness dominates his theological efforts to hold together God's nearness and His otherness, man's dependence and his freedom, his intimacy and fear of the Eternal Thou. Buber would, as it were, hold on to both sides of the cord which binds man to God in reciprocal relationship. In his portrayal of the reciprocity and interdependence of human and divine relationships, he has raised his expectations in man. With the advent of evil the dignity of the I and the closeness of the Thou are severely tested. Only the shock of evil throws Buber back into the arms of paradox so that his polarities may not be torn loose from their unifying source.

THE BROKEN DIALOGUE

No contemporary religious philosopher has more deliberately stressed the centrality of the dialogic relationship between heaven and earth than Martin Buber. Man is created by God with an autonomy enabling him to "stand over against God."²⁰ Freedom and spontaneity characterize the independence of man in his engagement with the personal God. Israel knows the attributes of God in a manner sufficient to follow His way and to imitate Him.

But it is precisely that trusting personal intimacy and its dialogic presuppositions which are shaken by the Holocaust. The call and response between the above and the below which Buber describes as the biblical view of existence are blocked by a wall of terror. Job's cry escapes from the earth beneath which tradition has thought it buried:

... how is a life with God still possible in a time in which there is an Oswiecim? The estrangement has become too cruel, the hiddenness too deep. One can still "believe" in the God who allowed these things to happen, but can one still speak to Him? Can one still as an individual and as a people, enter at all into a dialogic relationship with Him? Can one still call to Him? Dare we recommend to the survivors of Oswiecim, the Job of the gas chambers: "Call to Him for He is kind, for His mercy endureth forever"?²¹

The silence of a living God is more appalling than the apostasy which announces His demise. For the man of faith the gnawing doubt does not question that He lives but whether He cares; and if He cares, whether He cares enough to act.

Buber's response to his own grieving question is enigmatic. In the place of explanation, Buber can only offer expectation. We are counseled to wait for the reappearance of the hiding God. "Though His coming appearance resembles no other one, we shall recognize again our cruel and merciful God."²²

The last is a sentence laden with ambiguity. How can we recognize His coming when it resembles no other one? Does the strangeness of His future advent suggest that Auschwitz marks a discontinuity of faith? Does the paradoxical conjunction "cruel and merciful" signify the breakdown of the intelligible moral syntax so crucial for dialogic communication? We must look elsewhere in Buber's writings to understand the implications of this odd conjunction of moral contraries.

In an important essay Buber contrasts personalistic faith, "the love of God," with the philosopher's conception, "the idea of deity."²³ Buber here refers to the Neo-Kantian philosopher Hermann Cohen, who identifies God with the moral ideal. Such identification, Buber warns, is destined to end in the breakdown of faith. The tragic contradictions between the moral ideal and the conduct of history can lead only to personal despair. More than

principle, more than the archetype of the ideal, the living God is personality. More than personality, God is "absolute personality."²⁴

This qualification of personality which Buber introduces is fully intended. He is aware of the paradoxical character of the phrase. The substantive concept "personality" combines with the adjective "absolute" in order "to contradict its normal concept."²⁵ For personality is too bound by moral associations to prevent Jobian disillusionment with God. An absolute, on the other hand, is unconditional, unlimited by standards or ideals, unrelated to and unbound by any other being. The absolute personality transcends the moral ideal. God is, as it were, the good beyond the good. So Buber insists that "the unity of God is not the good; it is the supergood."²⁶ Such a God must be accepted and loved "in His deepest concealment."²⁷ All the ingredients for a personalistic theodicy are at hand. A supragood absolute personality will produce no Jobian discontent. Job will accept every moral incongruity of life without resentment. He who

begins to provide himself with a comprehensible God, constructed thus and not otherwise, runs the risk of having despair of God in view of the actualities of history and life, or falling into inner falsehood. Only through the fear of God does man enter so deep into the love of God that he cannot be cast out of it.²⁸

There is pragmatic wisdom in Buber's radicalization of an earlier understanding of the I-Thou relationship. Expecting nothing or anything of God, Job cannot be disappointed. All anticipations of God's goodness derive from Job's ignorant conceits, from the alleged unity of goodness which forms the moral ideal of God.

Through his notion of God as absolute personality, Buber has removed the ground from under the feet of the old Job. We are tempted to ask wherein such a faith in a suprapersonal, supramoral God differs from a religious masochism which finds love in the signs of indifference or hostility? Faith in an incomprehensible supergood personality may prevent disillusionment, but it is a resolution as desperate as plucking out one's eyes to forestall the possible loss of vision.

Buber has provided costly safeguards against Jobian despair. The paradoxes which unite absoluteness with personality and the

good with the supergood are consistent with the paradox of his "merciful and cruel God." It cannot be denied, however, that the earlier intimacy, trust, and reciprocity characterized by Buber's I-Thou relationship are no longer the same. Job has been intimidated by the absolute personality. How can he protest, in the manner which Buber describes as his legitimate struggle, against the "God-given" verdict of history which issues in evil?²⁹ Having shattered the idols of a humanly comprehensible God, Buber, it would appear to us, has lost the reason to encourage Job's rebellion. And yet, Buber writes:

My father Job (no Israelite, it seems and yet my father) protests and trusts in one; we come to feel that to love his own fate remains alien to him to the end, and God encourages him not to love it. He stands in an unsurpassably awesome dialogue; but God does not deny himself to him as a partner in dialogue.³⁰

Nor is it clear what remains of Buber's personal God after his qualifications have been made. On the one hand, we cannot reduce God's absoluteness to a personality. In addressing God as person "we are making no statement about the absolute which reduces it to the personal."³¹ Yet we are allowed by God, "so to speak," to experience Him as person.³² We are given permission to speak and believe that the absolute becomes a person "because in our human mode of existence the only reciprocal relation with us that exists is a personal one."³³ There is a marked unclarity here. Is the personalistic language allowed as an accommodation to man's conceptual limitations in describing his relationship to the absolute? Or does it affirm an independent ontologic status of personality to God? Buber, in his important postscript to the second edition of *I and Thou*, argues for the description of God as a Person.³⁴ God's personality makes it possible for man to enter into a relationship of mutuality with the Eternal Thou. The existence of this mutuality between God and man cannot be proved but can be testified to by witnesses who have experienced dialogic relationship. Does, however, the personal relationship experienced by man with the other testify to the other as a "Person God"?³⁵ The grounds for such a claim are not different from those which, for Buber, establish the "thou-ness" of a tree or horse. We recall that, for Buber, it can happen through "will and grace" that man can

become bound up in a relation to a tree which is mutual.³⁶ The wholeness and unity of the tree is said to disclose itself "to the glance of one who says Thou."³⁷ He recalls that the horse he stroked as a child "placed itself elementally in the relation of *Thou* and *Thou* with me."³⁸

Buber, we contend, confuses the *reality of a personal experience* with the *experience of a real person*. The insensibility of a relationship which affects me personally is neither proof nor witness to the personality of the other. The fact that our intentions toward others may alter our personal feeling and comprehension of them in no way legitimates the ascription of the properties of personality, feeling, and intelligence to them. To ascribe personality to the other and claim a relationship of mutuality with the other on grounds of truly intense, personal experience is logically illicit and morally open to all kinds of dangers. We sense that Buber's *als ob* sanction to speak of God as person betrays his own unresolved ambiguity in this matter.

ETHICAL DECISION AND ABSOLUTE PERSONALITY

There are other complications in speaking of God as person, particularly in the realm of moral decision. There is a price to be paid for abandoning morally comprehensible ideals to the personal or suprapersonal absolute. There is equally a price to be paid for holding firm to moral principles and to the right to live according to their intelligibility. The first decision affects our ethics, the other our theology.

Relationships between man and the absolute personality at times eventuate in a command to act. But Buber is unhappy with the fideist response of the knight of faith who suspends the ethical and submits to the imperatives of the supramoral divine person. He is troubled by the sinister ventriloquism of the Moloch of our times, which commands in God's name.³⁹ Unable to accept Kierkegaard's teleological suspension of the ethical, Buber would have us treat Abraham and his era as exceptional. It is not at all easy for us to understand why Buber thinks he can safely assign the Abraham-Isaac event to the past, or to accept his confidence that "Abraham, to be sure, could not confuse with another the voice which once made him leave his homeland and which he at that time recognized as the voice of God without the speaker saying to

him who he was."⁴⁰ From the rest of us, in our confused age, God demands nothing more than justice and love, "not much more than the fundamental ethical."⁴¹ Here Buber's ethics of belief turns him to the humanly comprehensible moral connotation of goodness.

Yet Buber's moral pragmatism cannot be so readily squared with his conviction that there can be no ethical criterion to be consulted when it is God's will which is to be filled. As Buber tells us, "He who really believes in God cannot acknowledge *any other courts* above his."⁴² To believe in the God above the good is to subordinate the fundamental ethical to the absolute person. Buber's oscillation and paradoxical language betray his torn commitments to both a moral and supramoral idea of divine personality. Haunted by the shades of Auschwitz, Buber feels compelled to hide the moral ideal behind the hidden God of Absolute Personality. We are not persuaded that the "cruel and merciful God" is responsive to the Jobian outcry. Buber contends that the philosopher's idea of the absolute dissolves "at the point where the absolute is love."⁴³ It seems to us that his own idea of the divine personality dissolves at the point where it is no longer lovable, at the point where Auschwitz appears:

THE COMPREHENSIBILITY OF GOD

The personalistic theodicies of Barth and Buber are curiously allied with the metaphysical theodicies in de facto abandoning the moral connotation of goodness when ascribed to God. However else they differ, in their deflection of the moral ideal and the deflation of man's capacity to know the moral attributes of God, metaphysical and personalistic theodicies are united. In common, traditional theodicies tend sooner or later to fall upon the incomprehensibility of God as their ultimate argument. The theological rationalist Maimonides insists upon a predicate agnosticism. "It cannot be said . . . that His existence is only more stable, His life more permanent, His wisdom more perfect and His will more general than ours."⁴⁴ There is no qualitative similarity between His virtues and ours. "Anything predicated of God is totally different from our attributes."⁴⁵ All terms such as "justice," "love," and "goodness" when applied to both God and man are homonymous.

Barth typically interprets the Psalmist's declaration of the infinite trustworthiness and righteousness of God as expressing

"the incomprehensibility of His goodness and faithfulness."⁴⁶ The verse from Isaiah 55 is cited to evidence the absolute, qualitatively different attributes of God and man. "For My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways My ways, saith the Lord."⁴⁷

But even on exegetical grounds, such theological interpretations, which make of these statements assertions of the inscrutability and wholly other character of the divine attributes, may be shown to err. The context of the oft-cited verse reveals no such intention. The succeeding verse explains its proper context.

For as the rain cometh down and the snow from heaven,
And returneth not thither,
Except it water the earth.
And make it bring forth and bud,
And give seed to the sower and bread to the eater;
So shall My word be that goeth forth out of My mouth:
It shall not return unto Me void
Except it accomplish that which I please,
And make the thing whereto I sent it prosper.⁴⁸

The prophet contrasts the efficacy and trustworthiness of God's ways with the impotence and backsliding of the faithless. God's thoughts and ways are "more" reliable, "more" just; but for all the difference in degree, they are not qualitatively "other" than the same attributes of goodness and faithfulness which apply to man. God is not man, because He restrains the fierceness of His anger and exercises His compassion.⁴⁹ The very call for man to imitate God's ways presupposes a qualitative continuity between divine and human moral virtues. The metaphysical attributes of omnipotence, eternity, and infinity are not emulatable and may not be understood, but *imitatio dei* requires an understanding of His moral qualities.

Ironically, as Mill noted, theologians seem interested in restricting man's ability to comprehend God's powers only with regard to those which describe His moral qualities. "We are never told that God's omnipotence must not be supposed to mean in infinite degree of the power we know in man and nature, and that perhaps it does not mean that he is able to kill us, or consign us to eternal flames."⁵⁰ Why then is the human signification of metaphysical powers justifiable while that of the moral powers is denied? We suggest that one major motivation for such moral-predi-

cate agnosticism is to deny the legitimacy of any moral critique of God. The "supra" prefixes which theologians attach to His goodness, and the mystery of His personality which they accentuate, manage to exclude the moral ideal of divine perfection from religious belief. It is a costly strategy for religion. *Quod supra nos, nihil ad nos*; what is beyond us is nothing to us. The *argumentum ad ignorantiam* of theodicy, however sophisticated, blunts the moral relationship between God and man predicated upon a common understanding of goodness. It denies a knowledge without which Paul could not contend "For what can be shown about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them."⁵¹

NOTES

- ¹Henry Aiken, *Reason and Conduct* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 182.
- ²Ludwig Koehler, *Old Testament Theology* (London: Lutterworth Press, 1957), p. 62.
- ³Genesis 18:19.
- ⁴Amos 3:7.
- ⁵Jeremiah 22:15; cf. 5:28, 7:5f., 9:23.
- ⁶Genesis 18:25.
- ⁷J. B. Soloveitchik, "The Lonely Man of Faith," *Tradition*, Summer 1965.
- ⁸Psalms 44:18ff.
- ⁹Exodus 33:23.
- ¹⁰Martin Buber, *I and Thou* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 78.
- ¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 6.
- ¹²*Ibid.*, p. 78.
- ¹³*Ibid.*, p. 79.
- ¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 83.
- ¹⁵Martin Buber, *Mamre* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1946), p. 105.
- ¹⁶Martin Buber, "The Question to the Single One," in *Between Man and Man* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1947), p. 78.
- ¹⁷Maurice Friedman, *Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), p. 106.
- ¹⁸Martin Buber, *Philosophical Interrogations*, ed. by Sidney Rome and Beatrice Rome (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964), p. 82.
- ¹⁹Martin Buber, *Good and Evil* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 142.
- ²⁰Martin Buber, *Eclipse of God* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1952), p. 105.
- ²¹Martin Buber, "The Dialogue Between Heaven and Earth," in *Four Existential Theologians*, ed. Will Herbert (New York: Doubleday, 1958), pp. 202-203.
- ²²*Ibid.*, p. 203.
- ²³Buber, "The Love of God and the Idea of Deity," in *Eclipse of God*, p. 49.
- ²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 60.
- ²⁵Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 134.
- ²⁶Buber, *Eclipse of God*, p. 60.

- ²⁷*Ibid.*
- ²⁸Martin Buber, "The Two Foci of the Jewish Soul," in *The Writings of Martin Buber*, ed. Will Herbert (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), p. 269.
- ²⁹Martin Buber, "Religion and Philosophy," in *Eclipse of God*, p. 37.
- ³⁰Buber, *Philosophical Interrogations*, p. 92.
- ³¹Buber, *Eclipse of God*, p. 96.
- ³²*Ibid.*, p. 60.
- ³³*Ibid.*, p. 97.
- ³⁴Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 135.
- ³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 136.
- ³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 8.
- ³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 126.
- ³⁸Paul Schilpp and Maurice Friedman, eds., *The Philosophy of Martin Buber* (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1967), p. 10.
- ³⁹Buber, *Eclipse of God*, p. 119.
- ⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 118.
- ⁴¹*Ibid.*
- ⁴²Buber, *Philosophical Interrogations*, p. 92.
- ⁴³Buber, *Eclipse of God*, p. 50.
- ⁴⁴Moses Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed* I:56.
- ⁴⁵*Ibid.*
- ⁴⁶Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, vol. III, pt. 3, p. 426, on Psalm 36:5-7.
- ⁴⁷Isaiah 55:8.
- ⁴⁸Isaiah 55:10-11.
- ⁴⁹Hosea 11:9.
- ⁵⁰Mill, *Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, p. 130.
- ⁵¹Romans, 1:19.